E-Pluribus | July 10, 2024
Free speech on campus shouldn't depend on its content; SCOTUS's role reversal; and the rise of the EINO (evangelicals in name only.)
A round-up of the latest and best musings on the rise of illiberalism in the public discourse:
Emma Camp: What Free Speech Rights Do Anti-Israel Activists Have on College Campuses?
Behavior is not speech. This would seem self evident (and yes, behavior can fall under the free expression umbrella), but some campus protesters say their free speech rights were violated because they were not permitted to pitch tents indefinitely on school grounds. While Emma Camp of Reason says universities must still enforce their policies in a neutral manner, they do have the right to control how their property is used.
In the aftermath of [pro-Palestinian] protests, many sympathetic commentators insisted that the response by university presidents to pro-Palestinian encampments was straightforward censorship.
Crackdowns on the encampments illustrate "the gulf between the ideals of the First Amendment and the actual practice of free speech in the United States," Megan Iorio, senior counsel at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, wrote in Tech Policy Press in May. "The freedom of individuals to assemble, associate, and express their opposition to the viewpoints of those in power is fundamental to the concept of free speech, yet the discourse has treated these rights as subservient to the rights of university administrators to enforce rules about the use of campus space."
The situation is less straightforward than how Iorio frames it. While university administrators have violated the rights of students peacefully protesting—for example, at several Texas public colleges—both private and public universities are generally well within their rights to ban tent encampments.
"While campus encampments are expressive conduct—no one doubts protesters are sending messages here—that's not the end of the story," writes Jessie Appleby of the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression. "Even in spaces where protest rights are at their maximum—public sidewalks, public parks, and open outdoor areas of public campuses—the government, including public universities, can still enforce reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on when, where, and how people protest."
While public universities are beholden to the First Amendment—and private universities that promise wide-ranging speech freedoms are open to claims of contract violation if they punish students for their speech—colleges are almost never required to allow a tent encampment to continue.
[. . .]
It is vitally important, however, that such a policy be enforced neutrally. If a college allowed a tent encampment in protest of one issue to proceed but cracked down on a pro-Palestinian one, that could constitute illegitimate viewpoint discrimination.
Read it all.
Richard M. Re: A conservative Warren court
What’s good for the goose is good for the gander, it is said, but now that conservatives command a majority on the Supreme Court, liberals are not inclined to view its decisions the way they used to. At the Washington Post, Richard Re compares the current slate of justices to the court of several decades ago and says the shift is simply part of a natural process, not a sign the system doesn’t work anymore.
In the 1960s, conservatives were the critics of the bold, liberal decisions of the Warren court. “Impeach Earl Warren” became a popular slogan, and the likes of Barry Goldwater intoned that, “of all three branches of Government, today’s Supreme Court is the least faithful” to “the principle of legitimacy in the exercise of power.”
Today, it is the opposite. The fact of a 6-3 supermajority changes both legal conservatism and liberalism. These shifts reflect a natural process of legal change, as court majorities tend to enhance their own power, while dissenters advocate for legal constraint. That was true during the Warren court of the 1960s, when liberals led the judiciary. It is true today.
While the Warren court was accused of endangering the judiciary and the nation at the time — just think of that era’s explosive decisions on school prayer, the Miranda warnings, legislative districting and desegregation — history has deemed otherwise.
Today, the decisions of the Roberts court are likely to have profound implications as well, including majority opinions before this year, like Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which eliminated constitutional abortion rights, or Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, which struck at affirmative action in higher education.
The legacies of these and other transformative rulings are yet to be decided.
It’s understandable for liberals to see this new era as beyond the scope of their understanding of democracy. But change doesn’t mean the court is broken. It means that the Roberts court is a conservative Warren court.
This role reversal is uncomfortable for liberals and conservatives alike, but it is also logical. The flexibility that conservative dissenters have long disdained is often essential to responsible judging. At the same time, the liberal justices, who are absorbing what were once strict, conservative principles, are performing a service by reminding the majority of its erstwhile views and curbing the court’s excesses.
Read it all here.
Asma Uddin: What the rise of the ‘secular evangelical’ portends for faith in the public square
The teaching of the gospel of Jesus Christ is what being “evangelical” is all about, or at least that’s how it’s supposed to work. Increasingly, however, Asma Uddin writes for the Deseret News, evangelicals are trading the good news of salvation for a political and cultural version instead.
[A] profound shift in the religious landscape is unfolding. New research shows that a significant minority of self-described evangelicals don’t subscribe to core Christian beliefs such as the divinity of Jesus. For them, evangelical identity seems to be less about theological conviction than cultural and political affiliation.
This trend is underscored by the surprising finding that small but growing numbers of Muslims, Hindus and Jews now identify as evangelical — a term once inextricable from its Christian origins. For these Americans, the word “evangelical” appears to be evolving into a catchall designation for a certain strain of GOP politics, one that emphasizes culture war issues and loyalty to former President Donald Trump.
This untethering of evangelical identity from doctrinal belief tracks with a broader realignment in which partisan allegiance is eclipsing religious affiliation as the primary driver of social and political attitudes. In some ways, this mirrors the advent of “cultural Catholicism,” a phenomenon in which many Americans identify as Catholic or partially Catholic even though they do not primarily define their religious identity as Catholic. Similarly, today’s cultural evangelicals may see their religious identity more as a marker of family history, cultural heritage or political inclination than as a matter of deep theological commitment. This has significant implications for how we understand the role and influence of evangelical Christianity in American public life.
At the same time, it’s important to recognize that neither evangelicalism nor secularism is a monolithic bloc. Within each camp, there is a wide range of beliefs, practices and political persuasions. Some evangelicals are deeply conservative, while others lean moderate or progressive. Some are single-issue voters fixated on abortion, while others prioritize issues like poverty, immigration or the environment. Likewise, the secular spectrum encompasses everyone from strident atheists to “spiritual but not religious” seekers to indifferent agnostics.
Acknowledging this diversity within and between religious and secular communities is crucial for avoiding the kind of sweeping generalizations that fuel polarization and hinder understanding. When we paint either side as a uniform, implacable force, we lose sight of the complex reality of American religious life.
[. . .]
Navigating this new landscape will require a more sophisticated understanding of the complex ways that religious identity intersects with race, ethnicity, generation and geography. And it will demand a more inclusive public discourse that makes space for a wider range of voices and experiences.
Read the whole thing.
Around Twitter (X)
Zaid Jilani has some thoughts about how Democrats should behave during a second Trump term:
Via Nicholas Grossman, a new pop culture reference that does not bode well for the president:
And finally, former Democratic Party presidential candidate Andrew Yang thinks he has the answer to the Democrats’ Joe Biden problem: